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ABSTRACT 
A Method for Evaluating Aircraft Electric Power System Sizing  
and Failure Resiliency 
Cory Kenneth Kross 
 
 With the More Electric Aircraft paradigm, commercial commuter aircraft 
are increasing the size and complexity of electrical power systems by increasing 
the number of electrical loads.  With this increase in complexity comes a need to 
analyze electrical power systems using new tools.  The Hybrid Power System 
Optimizer (HyPSO) developed by Airbus SAS is a simulator designed to analyze 
new aircraft power systems.  This thesis project will first provide a method to 
assess the reliability of complex aircraft electrical power systems before and after 
failure and reconfiguration events.  Next, an add-on to HyPSO is developed to 
integrate the previously developed reliability calculations.  Proof-of-concepts 
including new data visualizations are performed and provided. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 Over the past century, air travel has matured into the safest mode of 
transportation per mile.  The design of aircraft, especially those for commercial 
commuter purposes, are heavily scrutinized by regulatory agencies.  Rightly so – 
a critical system failure at any point in the flight could have devastating 
consequences, including significant loss of life, if there are not sufficient recovery 
capabilities built into the aircraft.  Recent technological advancements have 
made aircraft safer and more reliable than ever.  Aircraft have become so safe 
that 70% of aircraft accidents leading to passenger or crew injury or death are 
caused by pilot error, not by system failure [1].  The odds of loss of life due to 
accident on any given flight, including general (non-commercial) aviation, are 1 in 
4.7 million [2].  Only considering commercial aviation, that number drops to 1 in 
45 million [3].  The 2013 calendar year had the fewest aviation related fatalities 
on record since World War II at 459 worldwide [3].  By comparison, there are 
forty thousand deaths per year in the United States alone related to motor vehicle 
accidents [4].  Figure 1 shows the downward trend in fatal accidents over time.  
Nevertheless, with new technologies comes increasing system complexity, and 
with increases in complexity come increased risk.  To mitigate the risk of 
catastrophic failure in complex systems, the reliability of the system must be 
evaluated with methods that accommodate current and future technologies. 
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Figure 1: Fatal Accidents per Year in Civil Aircraft with 19 or More Passengers [2] 
 
SPONSORSHIP AND SIMULATOR OVERVIEW 
 Airbus SAS, a leading commercial aircraft manufacturer, has sponsored 
this project to further research in the area of aircraft failure and reconfiguration.  
Airbus SAS, hereby known as the Sponsor, has provided a proprietary software 
simulator called Hybrid Power System Optimizer, hereafter known as HyPSO or 
“the Tool” for short.  HyPSO performs steady-state analysis of aircraft power 
systems, taking into consideration mechanical power, electrical power, thermal 
flows and other parameters to optimize the system for minimal fuel consumption.  
It is a highly flexible tool, able to simulate any mission (flight plan) in varying 
levels of detail as required by the user.  Inputs to the system include “Engine 
Decks” (a highly detailed, proprietary description of the fuel burn characteristics 
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of the aircraft engine), detailed load and machine profiles, airframe and drag 
characteristics, mission profiles, and atmospheric conditions.  Finally, HyPSO 
has the capabilities to simulate failures in the aircraft, and to reconfigure the 
power system to recover from these failures.  Simulated failures and power 
system reconfiguration will be the main function of the Tool exercised in this 
project.  Most other simulation types require the Engine Deck, but this data is 
heavily guarded by the industry.  The Sponsor is a division of Airbus Group SE, a 
European aerospace and defense corporation, whose primary competitors are 
United States aerospace corporations, including Boeing in the civil aircraft space.  
As the author of this project is a United States citizen, the Sponsor could only 
provide limited resources as per company policy.  Those resources excluded 
Engine Decks, thereby limiting the scope of this project. 
STATEMENT OF PROBLEM 
 The leading cost driver in commercial airliners is fuel.  A medium haul 
aircraft (3-6 hours of flight time) will achieve a fuel efficiency anywhere from 
70-100 miles per gallon per seat.  A Boeing 737-400 will burn approximately 
12,000 kg of fuel on a 2000 nautical mile flight – the distance from Los Angeles 
to New York.  Fuel burn is very closely related to the mass of the aircraft.  A 
reduction of one kilogram of mass in the aircraft will save $4,500 in a short or 
medium haul aircraft over twenty years of operation [5]. In a competitive 
commercial airliner market, there is a strong motivation to reduce operating 
costs, in part by reducing the weight of the aircraft.  By reducing the weight of the 
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aircraft, the Sponsor could achieve a competitive advantage in the marketplace.  
In the electrical power system, weight is tied to power handling.  Increasing the 
power consumed by the aircraft will increase the weight of the systems needed to 
generate and manage the power.  Thus, system optimization is needed to 
minimize the electrical power consumption in order to reduce the weight of the 
power system. 
 Recently, the aerospace industry has been influenced by the “More 
Electric Aircraft” paradigm, which is driving the reduction of pneumatic, 
mechanical, and hydraulic power systems in favor of electrical systems.  
Pneumatic, mechanical, and hydraulic systems are generally mature 
technologies that have been in operation for many decades.  Industry-wide 
acceptance and knowledge of these technologies contributes to widespread 
ability to maintain these systems.  Moving to new technologies requires 
maintenance crews to undergo additional training, and the risk of making 
mistakes during maintenance increases when crews are unfamiliar with the new 
systems.  There must be sufficient competitive advantage in new technologies for 
airlines to forgo mature technologies and purchase new, cutting-edge aircraft.  It 
is difficult to say that replacing other power systems with electrical systems will 
reduce operating costs by increasing the overall maintainability of the aircraft; 
therefore, at universities and in industry, research is ongoing to determine the 
benefits of More Electric Aircraft with respect to fuel burn.  If more research is 
performed on the viability and benefits of electrical systems, then the industry 
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may be able to develop More Electric Aircraft that better serve their customers 
and increase sales.  
Legacy systems are mature, and there is a significant amount flight 
heritage and data backing up their reliability.  With the move to more electrical 
systems, designers are relying on analytical tools such as HyPSO to show that 
these newer systems will be as safe and those they are replacing while 
improving overall system performance in terms of fuel burn.  Proving that 
electrical systems are superior to other power types is out of the scope of this 
project.  Instead, the objective is to add to the growing pool of research 
describing how a More Electric Aircraft will operate.  Specifically, this project will 
provide a method by which the reliability of aircraft electrical power systems can 
be assessed using HyPSO.  Using this method, the Sponsor may use the Tool to 
simulate the reliability of future More Electric Aircraft power systems. 
 
OBJECTIVE 
 During flight, system failures may occur in the electric power system which 
reduces the amount of electrical power available to the system.  At the system 
level, simulators are used to show that the electrical architecture will be able to 
handle all loads, even in a state of reduced power availability.  Redundancy is 
built into electrical power distribution networks to prevent loss of power to 
electrical loads after system failures, thereby increasing the reliability of the 
electric power system.  However, redundancy increases the mass of the aircraft, 
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thereby operating costs through increased fuel burn.  There is a trade-off 
between increased reliability through redundancy and aircraft mass.  The 
objective of this project is to provide a methodology and framework that aircraft 
electrical power systems designers may use to optimize the reliability and mass 
of the aircraft.  The first phase of this project was the development of a MATLAB 
add-on to HyPSO to assist in failure simulations in conjunction with the Tool’s 
existing capabilities.  The add-on performs analysis of the large amounts of data 
generated by the Tool.  A data structure is provided to store the simulation data, 
and data visualizations were built to increase the usefulness of data structure by 
simplifying data comprehension. 
 Sizing the engines and generators is a complicated problem that 
requires significant amounts of data such as electrical load profiles; therefore, 
sizing is out of the scope of the project.  In the first phase of the project, a 
general optimization framework was built in the MATLAB add-on to assist 
designers in power system sizing.  The second phase of the project is a 
proof-of-concept of the add-on, the objective of which is to increase the available 
power at the generators while maintaining at least the same amount of reliability 
in the electrical network.  If the available power is increased, then either the 
electrical networked may be downsized to decrease weight thereby reducing 
operating cost, or more electrical loads may be added to improve the customer 
experience and allow customers to gain a competitive edge in the market. 
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II. BACKGROUND AND RESEARCH 
AIRCRAFT POWER SYSTEMS 
 During normal flight operations, engines generate all power consumed 
throughout the aircraft.  Engines burn jet fuel to generate power.  Traditionally, 
the engine generates five types of power: thrust, electrical, pneumatic, hydraulic, 
and mechanical.  Power plants are built into the engine to generate electrical 
power.  A general quantitative breakdown of power generation for a conventional 
aircraft is shown in Figure 2.  Most of the useful power extracted from the jet fuel 
is converted into propulsion thrust, but about 5% goes towards the other forms of 
power [5].  Only about 0.2% of the total engine power is consumed by electrical 
systems [6].  With More Electric Aircraft, the proportion of total power consumed 
by electrical systems is expected to increase. 
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Figure 2: Breakdown of Engine Power Generation[1] 
 Due to the minor contribution of electrical power generation to fuel burn, 
electrical efficiency does not contribute significantly to fuel efficiency.  However, 
improved electrical power efficiency does reduce waste heat generation, which is 
an important consideration in a closed environment such as an aircraft.  Thermal 
management is a large topic in aircraft design, and one that HyPSO explores in 
detail.  Reducing heat production through increased electrical efficiency will 
reduce the amount of weight needed for thermal management, providing another 
way that improved electrical systems can reduce operating costs. 
 Pneumatic power is high pressure air that is bled from the engine and 
used for wing de-icing and air conditioning, among other uses.  This form of 
power is in the process of being phased out – the Boeing 787, Boeing’s latest 
9 
commercial airliner, uses electrical heaters and compressors for de-icing and 
environmental control[15].   
Mechanical power, used for fuel pumps and flight control surface actuation 
is also being phased out.  Previously gearbox-driven mechanical pumps are now 
powered by electric motors.   
Hydraulic power is generated by hydraulic pumps attached to the gearbox 
of the engine. Its main uses are for actuation of flight control surfaces, landing 
gear extension and retraction, and ground steering and braking.  Engine shaft-
driven hydraulic pumps are being replaced with electric pumps.   
These are just a few examples of how power systems and loads are 
changing within the More Electric Aircraft paradigm, and the reason why power 
system research with respect to reliability and mass is currently in demand. 
ELECTRIC POWER GENERATION 
 There are several common electrical power generation topologies: 
constant speed drive, variable speed constant frequency, and variable frequency 
systems, as seen in Figure 3.  Conventional aircraft use one of the topologies 
that generate a constant 400Hz AC voltage.  Due to the increase of variable 
frequency tolerant loads, the variable frequency technique is becoming more 
common.  Variable frequency requires the least amount of front end mechanical 
structures and power electronics[8].  Two commuter aircraft that have recently 
reached the market, the Boeing 787 and the Airbus A380, both use this 
technique.  The Boeing 787 has four 150kVA generators supplying four main 
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230V 380-800Hz distribution bus bars.  Many of the architectures researched 
have four main electrical generators.  In Appendices C and D, two Honeywell 
architectures are given that employ two engines with two generators per engine.  
The four generator topology will be the main architecture used for this project. 
 
Figure 3: Electrical Power Generation Techniques [7] 
 When the aircraft manufacturer collaborates with an engine manufacturer, 
electrical power generation is of less importance than the key design point 
characteristics – take-off weight, cruising altitude, and thrust.  Thus, the 
generator is bound by design decisions already made for the engine design, such 
as torque output and rotations per minute.  Generators are designed or selected 
based on key parameters such as efficiency, power output during normal use, 
maximum power output (usually occurring in emergency situations), and time 
allowable at maximum power output.  Data about the specific engine in use and 
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the load profile of the aircraft would be needed to size a generator.  In particular, 
the engine data is highly confidential and depends greatly on the specific 
application.  Secondly, load profiles, such as in Figure 4, require thorough testing 
and statistical models to describe them.  Choosing a specific generator is a 
significant sizing and optimization problem that requires a computer simulator 
such as HyPSO.  Generators are sized to accommodate generator failure, which 
is a key point that this project will explore. 
 
Figure 4: Sample Electrical Load Profile Over Time [3] 
ELECTRIC POWER DISTRIBUTION AND MANAGEMENT 
 Since the electrical power generation is self-contained, the power 
management must also be self-contained.  There are several different types of 
electrical loads that require different voltage types and magnitudes.  For 
example, wing ice protection is essentially a heater, so it may utilize variable 
frequency AC input.  Cockpit avionics are computers, so they require clean, 
regulated DC voltage.  All of this power management occurs within electrical 
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panels throughout the aircraft.  The Primary Electrical Power Distribution Center 
(PEPDC) houses the main power distribution, management, and protection 
devices.  It is split into its redundant sections: side 1 and side 2.  The PEPDC 
supplies the Secondary Electrical Power Distribution Centers (SEPDCs) and 
Secondary Power Distribution Boxes (SPDBs), which contain protective devices 
such as circuit breakers, contactors, and, more recently, solid state power 
controllers (SSPC).  On the Airbus A380, there are two such SEPDCs and eight 
SPDBs.  The Airbus A380, which first flew in 2005, has some features of the 
MEA trend, while retaining some conventional systems.  A summary of the power 
distribution and management systems in the A380 is given in Table 1. 
Table 1: Summary of Airbus A380 Electric Power System 
4 Turbofan engines 
4 150kVA, 360-800Hz AC generators 
2 120kVA, 400Hz Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) 
4 External Power Connections (400 Hz) for ground power 
 
1 70kVA Ram Air Turbine 
3 300A Battery charge regulator units (BCRU) (regulated Transformer Rectifier 
Units) 
1 300A Transformer Rectifier Unit (TRU) 
3 50Ah Batteries 
1 Static Inverter 
1 300A APU TRU (for APU starting) 
1 50Ah TRU Battery (for APU starting) 
 
 The Boeing 787, first flying in 2009, is a good example of a More Electric 
Aircraft. The physical layout for the Boeing 787 is given in Figure 5.  The PEPDC 
corresponds to the forward E/E bay, the SEPDC corresponds to the aft E/E bay, 
and the SPDBs are the remote power distribution units.  It has four 250kVA 
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variable frequency generators. The Environmental Control System is the largest 
electrical load, consuming about 500kVA.  Hydraulic motor pumps draw about 
400kVA, and the wing ice protection system draws 100kVA[15].  A view of 
Boeing 787 power distribution is provided in Figure 6: Abstracted View of Boeing 
787 Power Distribution [2].  
 
Figure 5: Physical View of Aircraft Electric Power Systems [2] 
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Figure 6: Abstracted View of Boeing 787 Power Distribution [2] 
AIRCRAFT CERTIFICATION 
 The United States and the European Union have entered into the Bilateral 
Aviation Safety Agreement that governs civil aircraft airworthiness certification.  
The US is governed by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and the EU by 
the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA).  This agreement allows simplified 
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certification processes in one region after the other region has already certified 
the aircraft.  Aircraft airworthiness certification is an incredibly lengthy and 
rigorous process, and the aircraft design processes are developed to meet the 
requirements of certification.  One major component to this certification is Safety 
Assessment [9]. 
 Safety Assessment is performed throughout the aircraft development 
cycle and involves lengthy system risk and hazard assessment.  Part of this 
assessment is the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), where specific 
failure mechanisms are identified in each system, subsystem, and component. 
Oftentimes FMEA involves a quantitative analysis of the failure rate of the 
component under examination.  For the purposes of this project, it will be 
assumed that quantitative FMEA has been performed on each of the systems 
under examination.  These analyses are out of the scope of this project, and the 
data from testing and actual system failure analysis performed in industry is 
unavailable due to the restrictions discussed in the Sponsorship and Simulator 
Overview section. 
 The FAA and the EASA (shown as JAA in Table 2) have defined allowable 
event occurrence rates for different levels of failure severities.  Table 2 details the 
allowable failure rates per flight hours for a given failure effect.  For example, a 
catastrophic failure, one which “prevents safe flight and landing,” must be 
extremely improbable or occur at a rate less than 1E-9 per flight hour, a 1 in a 
billion chance of occurring over one hour of flight.  Failures that occur frequently, 
or more than once in 1000 flight hours, must have a minor severity classification, 
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meaning that its effect causes a “slight reduction in safety margin” or “some 
inconvenience to occupants.”  The EASA probability classifications shall be used 
in this project, as summarized in Table 3. 
Table 2: Failure Condition Severity as Related to Probability Objectives [9] 
 
 
Table 3: Summary of Event Probability Classification 
Probability 
(Qualitative) 
> 1E-3 1E-3 to 1E-5 1E-5 to 1E-7 1E-7 to 1E-9 < 1E-9  
Rate of 
Occurance 
Frequent Reasonably 
Probable 
Remote Extremely 
Remote 
Extremely 
Improbable 
Classification Minor Major Hazardous Catastrophic 
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III. SYSTEM RELIABILITY ANALYSIS 
 Reliability may be defined as the probability that no failure will occur over 
a given time period.  Depending on the context, reliability could have different 
meanings for aircraft power systems.  In the context of safety, a reliable aircraft is 
one that will not experience catastrophic system failure.  Catastrophic system 
failures are incredibly rare, so for the purposes of this project the definition 
should be narrowed. 
Airlines are service companies that depend on customer satisfaction to 
retain their business.  If the customer has a bad experience on an aircraft, they 
will choose a different airline for their next flight, and the airline may choose a 
different aircraft manufacturer to improve customer experience.  A bad 
experience could result from the failure of a non-safety related electrical load, 
such as the in-flight entertainment system.  For a commercial aircraft, all loads 
are considered essential for the customer experience.   
In this context, a reliable electrical power system is one that supplies all 
electrical loads with power during the entire flight.  The reliability 𝑅 of the power 
distribution system is calculated from 𝑃, the probability any electrical load will not 
be serviced with power: 
𝑅 = 1 − 𝑃 
Aircraft designers must maintain sufficient redundancy in the electrical network 
such that if any particular component fails during the flight, its redundant system 
may accommodate the failed component and continue to supply loads with 
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power.  Redundancy increases the reliability of the system by decreasing the 
probability that a load will not be serviced. 
DEPENDENCY DIAGRAMING AND FAULT TREE ANALYSIS 
 Two common methods of quantitative reliability analysis are dependency 
diagraming and fault tree analysis.  These methods are used to determine the 
reliability of complex systems using the component failure rates determined 
through FMEA as previously described.  The parameter of interest is the 
probability that any particular electrical load will be without power.  The 
probability of failure of aircraft systems are generally given in units of flight hours; 
for example, the chance that a given load will be without power in any flight hour 
is the probability 𝑃. 
 A fault tree is a graphical structure that contains all of the failure modes of 
the system and the interrelationships of failure modes.  A fault tree describes the 
many ways that a system can fail.  This method uses traditional logic gates to 
structure probabilistic events.  An “OR” gate is equivalent to systems in series: if 
one of the systems fail then the entire series chain of systems fails.  For 
example, if an AC/DC converter fails, each load supplied by the converter also 
fails because it is without power.  An “AND” gate is equivalent to redundant 
systems in parallel: all of the parallel components must fail for the system to fail.  
For example, if a load is supplied by two AC/DC converters, both converters 
must fail for the load to be without power.   
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A dependency diagram is a block diagram representation of a system, 
where the blocks are components within the system.  An unbroken chain from 
beginning to end represents an operational system.  The components have a 
probability of failure 𝑃, and if their failures cause the chain to be broken, then the 
system as a whole will fail.  Figure 7 shows the correlation between a fault tree 
gate and the corresponding dependency diagram segment.  If failure event 1 
(described by P1) occurs, then the series system represented by an OR gate will 
fail, but the parallel system described by the AND gate will remain functional.  
The parallel system described by the AND gate will fail if both failure event 1 and 
failure event 2 (P2) occurs.  
 
Figure 7:  Fault Tree to Dependency Diagram Correspondence 
 This is the essence behind redundancy.  By adding components in 
parallel, there is a backup component in case one of the components fails.  By 
identifying and anticipating component failures, system designers can add 
components in parallel to increase the reliability of the system as a whole.  
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From the equations given next, it is apparent that adding more 
components in series will increase the probability that the system will fail. Adding 
redudant components in parallel decreases the probability that the system will 
fail. 
𝑃𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠 = 1 − ∏(1 − 𝑃𝑖) 
𝑃𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑙 = ∏ 𝑃𝑖 
 These concepts are demonstrated with a small test architecture given in 
Figure 8: Small Test Architecture in Nominal State with Labels.  This diagram 
was built in yEd, a graphing tool, using a custom palette built by Airbus.  Using 
this software, diagrams of the electrical power systems are built as inputs to 
HyPSO.  HyPSO reads the components and interconnections in the graph and 
creates a description of the power system within the simulator.  From there, the 
user inputs data describing each component.  This simple test architecture will be 
used throughout this project as a proof of concept.  There are two turbofan 
engines that each drive a generator.  The generator supplies an AC bus, and 
each AC bus supplies an AC load.  In reality, a bus bar supplies many loads, but 
for the purposes of this project the loads will be combined and represented by a 
single consumer of power.  The AC buses also supply Transformer Rectifier 
Units (TRUs), which rectify the voltage to supply DC buses.  Each DC bus, in 
turn, supplies a DC load (also a combined representation of many loads). 
 The small test architecture in Figure 8 is in a nominal state, meaning that it 
is operating normally with no failures in the system.  The power paths, 
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represented by solid arrows, show the direction of power flow through the 
system.  Brown arrows are mechanical power, e.g. the shaft of the engine driving 
an electrical generator.  Green arrows are flows of electrical power.  Dashed 
green arrows are reconfigurable power paths.  In reality, a reconfigurable path is 
a contactor – a large switch that enables or disables a power path.  In nominal 
states, the contactors in the reconfigurable paths are open and power is not 
flowing on that path.  When failures occur, the contactors can close to allow 
power to flow along the reconfigurable path. 
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Figure 8: Small Test Architecture in Nominal State with Labels 
 This is a conventional, although simplified, representation of an aircraft 
power system.  It is also within the capabilities of HyPSO to interpret the 
components in this architecture in various ways.  The generators could be 
interpreted as DC generators supplying DC buses. The TRUs could be 
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interpreted as DC-DC converters supplying lower voltage buses, or inverters 
supplying AC buses.  The Tool is flexible and generic in that it does not require a 
specification of the voltage types or magnitudes for the buses, so the user may 
represent them however they wish.  For example, the TRU does not actually 
perform any voltage rectification within the Tool.  A TRU simply represents the 
efficiency loss a TRU would have on the power system.  It would also generate 
heat, which is not represented in Figure 8 but would be analyzed by aircraft 
designers using the Tool.  The manufacturer of the TRU would provide the 
aircraft designers data for the Tool that describes the efficiency of the TRU under 
varying amounts of load.  The output power of the TRU is less than the input 
power, depending on the power draw.  This property applies to any voltage 
converter, AC-DC, DC-DC, or otherwise, thus this TRU block can represent any 
such converter. 
 Fault tree analysis and dependency diagramming were performed on this 
simple architecture to validate the process.  For this project three modes of 
failure will be analyzed, but this method can and should be extended to include 
other failure modes.  The three components set to fail are the generators, TRUs, 
and bus bars.   
Assume the following probabilities of failure for one hour of flight (these 
values will be used throughout the project): 
𝑃𝐵 = 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑏𝑢𝑠 𝑏𝑎𝑟 𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒 = 1 ∗ 10
−6 
𝑃𝐺 = 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒 = 7 ∗ 10
−4 
𝑃𝑇 = 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑇𝑅𝑈 𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒 = 8 ∗ 10
−5 
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 In other words, the probability of a bus bar failing in a given flight hour is 1 
in 1,000,000. The probability of a generator failing is 7 in 10,000 per flight hour.  
The probability of a TRU failing is 8 in 100,000 per flight hour. 
 Note for that the TRU may be treated as an electrical load of the AC bus 
bar.  Just like the other loads attached to the bus bar, the TRU only has one input 
power path such that it may only be supplied by the AC bus bar.  The probability 
that a load will fail, or not be supplied with power from the bus bar, is represented 
by the dependency diagram in Figure 9. 
 
Figure 9: Dependency Diagram for AC Load 1 Failure 
For AC Load 1 to fail to be supplied with power, AC Bus 1 must fail, OR 
Generator 1 AND Generator 2 OR AC Bus 2 must fail. If AC Bus 1 fails, there is 
no possible way power can reach AC Load 1, so it will fail regardless of the state 
of Generator 1, Generator 2, and AC Bus 2. However, if Generator 1 fails, AC 
Bus 1 can still be supplied with power by Generator 2.  For this to occur, the 
contactor on Reconfigurable Path 1 will close, thereby supplying AC Bus 1 via 
AC Bus 2.  In this failure state, if a second failure occurs in Generator 2 or Bus 
bar 2, no power available is from either of the two redundant paths, and AC Load 
1 fails.  
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PAC_Load1 in Figure 9 is represented by the equations below.  There is a 2 
in a billion chance that a failure will occur in a given flight hour leading to the loss 
of power to AC Load 1. 
𝑃𝐴𝐶_𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑑1 = 1 − (1 − 𝑃𝐵𝐴𝐶1)(1 − 𝑃𝐺1[1 − (1 − 𝑃𝐵𝐴𝐶2)(1 − 𝑃𝐺2)]) 
𝑃𝐴𝐶_𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑑1 = 1 − (1 − 2 ∗ 10
−9)(1 − 1 ∗ 10−9[1 − (1 − 2 ∗ 10−9)(1 − 1 ∗ 10−9)])
= 2 ∗ 10−9 
The dependency diagram in Figure 9 and the equations above also apply 
to AC Load 2 in a mirrored fashion by swapping first side components for second 
side.  This scenario is shown in Figure 10.  Assuming that the components in 
both of the redundant paths have equal probabilities of failing (e.g., PBAC1 = 
PBAC2), the probability that AC Load 2 will not be powered is equal to the 
probability that AC Load 1 will not be powered.  This parallelism between the two 
sides of the aircraft will be leveraged in the system reliability analysis. 
 
Figure 10: Dependency Diagram for AC Load 2 Failure 
The probability that DC Load 1 will not be powered is described by the 
dependency diagram in Figure 11. 
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Figure 11: Dependency Diagram for DC Load Failure 
This structure is slightly more complicated because there are more paths 
through which DC Load 1 can be supplied with power, since the load is 
“downstream” from both reconfigurable paths.  Now both contactors may be used 
to route power to the load.  Note that the probability of AC Load 1 and AC Load 2 
being without power are included in this dependency diagram.  The calculation 
for PLoad_AC1 represents the probability that power cannot flow from AC Bus 1 to a 
load on the bus, either through normal means or through Reconfigurable Path 1.  
As previously mentioned, the TRU may be seen as a load of the AC bus; 
therefore PAC_Load1 also represents the probability that power is not supplied to 
TRU 1.  The probability that DC Load 1 is without power is given below: 
𝑃𝐷𝐶_𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑑1 = 1 − (1 − 𝑃𝐵𝐷𝐶1)(1
− [1 − (1 − 𝑃𝑇𝑅𝑈1)(1 − 𝑃𝐴𝐶_𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑑1)][1
− (1 − 𝑃𝐵𝐷𝐶2)(1 − 𝑃𝑇𝑅𝑈2)(1 − 𝑃𝐴𝐶2)] 
𝑃𝐷𝐶_𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑑1 = 1 − (1 − 2 ∗ 10
−9)(1
− [1 − (1 − 3 ∗ 10−9)(1 − 2 ∗ 10−9)][1
− (1 − 2 ∗ 10−9)(1 − 2 ∗ 10−9)(1 − 2 ∗ 10−9)]) 
𝑃𝐷𝐶_𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑑1 = 2 ∗ 10
−9 
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The probability that any load will be without power is represented by the 
dependency diagram in Figure 12 and calculated below: 
𝑃 = 1 − (1 − 𝑃𝐴𝐶_𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑑)
2
(1 − 𝑃𝐷𝐶_𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑑)
2
 
𝑃 = 1 − (1 − 2 ∗ 10−9)2(1 − 2 ∗ 10−9)2 
𝑃 = 8 ∗ 10−9 
 
Figure 12: Dependency Diagram for Any Load Failure 
Therefore, the reliability of the system is: 
𝑅 = 1 − 𝑃 = 1 − 8 ∗ 10−9 
 This result was confirmed with fault tree analysis, using the analogous 
representation in Figure 7.  For the fault tree constructed to represent the small 
test architecture, refer to Appendix G.  The calculation was performed in a tool 
developed by the Electric Power Research Institute.  The tool, Computer Aided 
Fault Tree Analysis (CAFTA), is able to model large, complex systems with many 
different modes of failure.  By evaluating the ANYLOAD node at the top of the 
fault tree in Appendix G, the tool’s results match that of the calculation.  The 
output is given in Figure 13.  The probability that any load will be without power is 
given by the ANYLOAD output.  The individual load failures are given by nodes 
G005 (PACLoad1), G011 (PACLoad2), G017 (PDCLoad1), and G023 (PDCLoad2) (see 
Appendix G) which each have a probability of 2*10^-9.  This result matches the 
dependency diagrams and associated calculations. 
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Figure 13: CAFTA Output 
MARKOV ANALYSIS 
 The main disadvantage to using dependency diagramming or fault tree 
analysis to analyze a complex system such as an aircraft power system is that 
these methods can only evaluate a single event.  For the previous example, only 
the probability of any load becoming unavailable was found.  This method cannot 
describe the multitude of ways in which the distribution network can supply all 
loads.  If an electrical generator fails, it is still possible to reconfigure the network 
and supply all loads with power.  For highly reconfigurable aircraft power 
systems, a different method is needed to describe the many different 
configurations of the architecture, even those which have all loads supplied with 
power.  Markov analysis is a methodology that is used to describe highly 
reconfigurable systems with many system states.  
 In Markov analysis, the system is described by “states,” which each 
unique state denoting a particular configuration of the system.  The “state space” 
describes all possible states, or configurations, of a system.  The state space is 
defined as all possible states the system can be in.  Figure 14 shows an example 
of a Markov state space.  If Figure 14 is considered a complete description of the 
system, then the state space S = {1 2 3 4 5}.  For any given time t, the system 
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must be in one of the states in the state space.  Thus, the probability that the 
system will be in one of the states in S at time t is 1, or guaranteed. The property 
is represented by the equation below: 
∑ 𝑃𝑛(𝑡)
𝑆
𝑛=1
= 1 
Transitions between states occur at a particular “rate of transition.”  There 
are five states in this state space, identified as 1 through 5, and the transition 
rates between states are given by .  Note that any given state may have 
multiple inputs and multiple outputs.  
 
Figure 14: Example State Space with State Transition Rates 
In Figure 14, the rate of transition between state 1 and state 3 is given 
by a.  Rates are given in terms of flight hours: event “a” will occur a times per 
flight hour.  A feasible value would be a = 10^-4 events per flight hour.  Given 
this rate, it is probable that event “a” will occur once every 1/a flight hours, or 
once every 10,000 flight hours.  If event “a” does occur, the system in Figure 14 
will transition from state 1 to state 3. From state 3, events “c” or “d” could occur, 
transitioning the system to states 4 or 5, respectively. 
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 In general, 𝑃𝑛(𝑡) is the probability that the system will be in state 𝑛 at 
time 𝑡.  For the system in Figure 14, the probabilities of being in each of the 
states are given by the differential equations below [4].  The rates of exiting a 
state are factored in as negatives, and the rates of entering the states are 
positive. 
𝑑𝑃1(𝑡)
𝑑𝑡
= −𝑎𝑃1(𝑡) 
𝑑𝑃2(𝑡)
𝑑𝑡
= −𝑏𝑃2(𝑡) 
𝑑𝑃3(𝑡)
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑎𝑃1(𝑡) + 𝑏𝑃2(𝑡) − (𝑐 + 𝑑)𝑃3(𝑡) 
𝑑𝑃4(𝑡)
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑐𝑃3(𝑡) 
𝑑𝑃5(𝑡)
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑑𝑃3(𝑡) 
 By solving this system of ordinary differential equations, the probability of 
being in any particular state may be determined.  The solution to these equations 
is too length to be included here.  Clearly, this problem becomes highly 
complicated even for small state spaces.  Each state has an associated ordinary 
differential equation, and the equations are interrelated.  MATLAB is employed to 
solve the set of equations.  The function stProb.m in Appendix E.3 was built to 
solve ordinary differential equations for this analysis. 
 In the context of aircraft electrical power systems, a state is a particular 
configuration of the contactors of the system. The Nominal state has the main 
path contactors closed, the reconfigurable path contactors open, and all 
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components functioning normally.  The Small Test Architecture of Figure 8 is in 
its nominal state: all components of the system are operational, and 
Reconfigurable Path 1 and 2 are both open (not conducting).  Markov analysis of 
architectures will always begin in the Nominal state.  In other words, the initial 
condition of the system is Nominal: at time t=0 the probability of being in the 
nominal state is 1, or guaranteed. 
𝑃𝑛𝑜𝑚(𝑡)|𝑡=0 = 1 
 From Nominal, the state space is traversed over time as failure events 
occur.  These failure events occur at the rates given by the transition rates. 
 For the analysis in this project, the state space will be considered to up to 
two failures; therefore, two state transitions can occur.  It is possible that three 
random failures could occur, and this analysis could easily be extended to 
include these cases, but the probability of three random failures occurring is so 
low that these events may be ignored.  This brings up an important consideration 
regarding this analysis: a failure will be considered as independent to all other 
failures – meaning that a failure will not increase or decrease the chance of 
another failure occurring.  In reality, it is feasible that a failure could propagate 
from one system to another, causing a second system to fail, or at least causing 
the rate of failure for the second system to increase dramatically. 
 Figure 15 shows the complete state space for up to two failures when 
considering the small test architecture in Figure 8.  For this analysis, we will 
consider failures for three types of systems: generators, transformer rectifier 
units, and buses.  In practice, this analysis should be extended to other systems 
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that may fail such as wiring, contactors, engines, loads, etc.  Obviously, the more 
components that are considered, the larger the state space will be.  Larger state 
spaces are more difficult to comprehend and manage during analysis.  For a 
large, complex power system with many different failure modes and 
configurations, there could be thousands of possible states.  This system of 
ordinary differential equations is too complicated to solve by hand.  An 
automated tool is needed, and MATLAB is chosen to perform the calculations.  In 
addition, this analysis will consider only the most important, top-level failure 
cases without regard of the actual mode of failure.  A generator has many failure 
modes, but they will be abstracted out and one failure rate will be assigned to the 
generator. 
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Figure 15: State Space for Small Test Architecture up to Two Failures 
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 For the small test architecture of Figure 8, eight systems total can fail: 2 
generators, 2 TRUs, and 4 buses. The state space for up to two failures is 65 
states, as shown in Figure 15.  Each of these states describes a configuration of 
the system.  Each state in its particular configuration can be described in reality 
as having certain power flow through each component, certain power generation 
levels by each of the generators, and certain load availability.  This is a large 
amount of information to store for each state.  However, this information is not 
always unique.  One state may have the same characteristics and configuration 
as another state.  Among these 65 states, there are redundancies that allow for 
the state space to be simplified.  
Figure 16 shows the procedure by which states may be aggregated.  This 
example shows a case in which effectively the same state is reached by two 
different series of transitions.  If both generators 1 and 2 fail, the order of the 
failures does not affect the outcome – the configuration and the power flow of the 
resultant state is the same whether generator 1 or 2 fails first.  However, the 
failure rates for generator 1 and generator 2 may be different.  One generator 
may be older than the other, or just recently undergone maintenance.  The 
calculations below show that due to the different failure rates, P1 and P2 are 
different.  This means that to combine identical states, each path to that state 
must be considered, and the probabilities must be summed together.  It is not 
sufficient to simply multiply a state probability by the number of times an identical 
state occurs.  In summary, the order in which systems fail DOES affect the 
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probability of a state occurring.  However, the state configuration and parameters 
(available power, load availability) DO NOT depend on failure order. 
 
Figure 16: Example State Aggregation 
Another instance in which states may be aggregated are trivial cases.  
Trivial cases are identified by this rule: if a bus fails, the configuration of the 
Reconfigurable Paths stays the same if a machine supplying, or supplied by, the 
bus also fails.  Figure 17 illustrates this point.  In this example, AC Bus 1 has 
failed and is removed from the architecture.  There is no longer a path for 
Generator 1 to send power to, and no path for TRU 1 to receive power from.  
Therefore, if Generator 1 or TRU 1 fails, there will be no appreciable change to 
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the architecture configuration or parameters.  In the same manner as the 
previous example of Figure 16, the two cases may be added to the single failure 
(AC Bus1) state: the case in which AC Bus1 fails then Generator 1 fails, and the 
case in which AC Bus 1 fails then TRU 1 fails. 
 
Figure 17: Example of Trivial Failure States 
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 This is only one example of state aggregation due to trivial states.  An 
aircraft designer performing Markov analysis could identify other rules that 
denote trivial states, further simplifying the state space. 
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IV. SIMULATIONS 
The Hybrid Power System Optimizer (HyPSO) tool is a complex simulator 
that is capable steady-state calculations of power system parameters, including 
mechanical and electrical power flows, thermal generation and dissipation, and 
thrust.  Components within the systems, such as engines, generators, and 
transformers, can be described to great detail using efficiency curves, thermal 
characteristics, minimum and maximum output power, and other parameters that 
are determined through testing or provided by the component manufacturers. 
HyPSO SETUP 
The architecture of the power system is first built in the yEd tool using a 
custom palette.  A HyPSO setup is performed for the Full Test Architecture in 
Figure 18.  This is a more realistic architecture than the Small Test Architecture 
of Figure 8.  The Full Test Architecture is based on the Airbus A380.  For this 
project, the components used will be mainly electrical power generators, 
distributors, converters, and consumer, but there are other types of systems 
available in the palette such as mechanical (e.g. gearboxes) and thermal (e.g. 
heatsinks).  This architecture includes Essential buses and Sheddable buses, 
which are a common feature of aircraft electrical power systems.  Essential 
buses must always be powered – if they are not, it could lead to a catastrophic 
failure of the aircraft.  Sheddable buses are the opposite – in the event of an 
emergency, they are the first bus to be shed if there is not enough power 
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available to power other loads.  For this analysis, we will assume that power 
cannot be routed through Essential and Sheddable buses to other buses.   
 
Figure 18: Full Test Architecture with Component Labels 
The architecture in Figure 18 is labeled for human comprehension. The 
various electrical machines that will be analyzed are labeled, and electrical paths 
are shown in green.  Reconfigurable electrical paths, or paths with a contactor 
that is normally open, are dashed green lines.  The Tool requires that the 
machines, bus bars, and paths be numbered so that the Tool may interpret them 
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and parse them into the various tabs of the simulator.  The architecture as 
numbered for HyPSO is provided as a reference in Appendix B. 
 For a very detailed system simulation, a lot of sensitive data is required.  
This data includes machine efficiency curves and load profiles.  This data is not 
publicly available, so it could not be incorporated into the simulations performed 
for this project.  Appendix F shows an example of a publicly available product 
sheet for a TRU – it does not include the data required to perform system 
simulations.  Figure 19 shows the input to the Tool to represent the machines, 
without this sensitive data.  Machines are either generators or TRU.  In this 
example, Machines 1 through 4 are generators, and Machine 5 through 8 are 
TRUs.  Generators are assumed to have a 100% efficiency, because the 
parameter of interest, available power at generators, is not affected by efficiency 
loss.  TRUs are assumed to have a 90% efficiency.  These values are 
represented by the Efficiency Vector.  In reality, this Efficiency Vector would be 
variable over load. In other words, the efficiency of the machine changes with the 
electrical load on the machine.  The other parameters, Path Out Thermal, 
Minimum Power, Continuous Power, Max Power, Time at Max Power, and Heat 
to Environment, are all parameters involved in sizing of the electrical network.  As 
previously discussed, sizing is out of the scope of this project.  In addition, these 
parameters were unavailable for this project. 
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Figure 19: Test Architecture Machines Tab 
 Since engine failures are not being considered for this method, the 
efficiency curve of the generator is of no concern. In reality, the generator will 
achieve peak efficiency at a particular output, but this data is not readily available 
to the public.  For this project, it is assumed that the engine is able to supply to 
the generator as much power as it needs, so the engine may be abstracted out of 
the problem.  For all architectures under test, the generator will be able to supply 
a maximum of 100kW of power, with an efficiency of 100% over its entire output 
range.  Hypothetically, if the generator was considered to have 80% efficiency 
while maintaining 100kW output that would simply mean that the engine would 
have to supply 125kW to the generator, which is possible in this scenario. The 
main parameter of interest, the available power at the output of the generator, is 
not affected by the efficiency of the generator.   
 When considering how to reconfigure the network after a failure, the 
efficiency of the TRU comes into consideration.  It becomes a load balancing 
problem, where the efficiency could be maximized after a reconfiguration event 
by choosing to supply more power through one TRU than through another.  This 
optimization problem is out of the scope of this project.  It would be necessary to 
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have data on the efficiency curves of TRUs used in aircraft.  Instead, TRUs will 
be considered to have a 90% efficiency over the entire output range. 
 The main parameters of interest in the HyPSO simulation are the available 
generator power and load availability.  Available generator power is determined 
at the output routing node (bus bar) of the generator and is defined by the total 
power able to be supplied to the bus, minus the power consumed by loads 
attached to the bus, or downstream of the bus: 
𝑃𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 = 𝑃𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 − 𝑃𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑑 
For example, in the small test architecture of Figure 8, if Generator 1 is 
capable of producing a maximum of 100kW of power, AC Load 1 and DC Load 1 
are each consuming 10kW of power, and the efficiency of TRU 1 is 90%, then 
the available power at AC Bus 1 is calculated as follows: 
𝑃𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒(𝐴𝐶 𝐵𝑈𝑆 1) = 100𝑘𝑊 − (10𝑘𝑊 +
10𝑘𝑊
90%
) = 78.9𝑘𝑊 
This means that at AC Bus1, there is 78.9kW of power that can be used to 
supply an increase in load demand.  If Generator 2 fails, then the network can be 
reconfigured such that some of the 78.9kW of available power is directed to the 
loads on the second side that need it.  
 In the HyPSO tool, to determine the power available at a routing node 
(bus bar), “Determine Available Power” must be enabled in the “Routing Nodes” 
tab, as shown in Figure 20.  Available power will be determined for the routing 
nodes at the output of each generator, such that the available power for each 
generator will be obtained.  
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Figure 20: Enable "Determine Available Power" in "Routing Node" Tab 
RECONFIGURATION EVENT 
 A reconfiguration event is demonstrated using the large test architecture.  
Generator 2 is set to fail at a simulation time of 200 seconds.  The failure can be 
seen in the Machine Power and Efficiency curve of Figure 21:  Machine 2 
(generator) drops to an output power of 0kW at 200s. 
 A reconfiguration event also occurs at 200s.  The contactor of 
Reconfigurable Path 20 closes and current begins to flow from Routing Node 3 to 
Routing Node 4.  Thus, Generator 1 is supplying the loads that Generator 2 can 
no longer supply.  We can see from the graph that, indeed, Generator 2 is now 
supplying double its original load since each side of the network has identical 
loads.  
 Finally, at 400s the second possible reconfiguration configuration is 
demonstrated.  Reconfiguration Path 20 opens so that Generator 1 is no longer 
supplying power to the second path, and Reconfiguration Path 13 closes such 
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that Generator 4 is now supplying power to the second path.  This is a significant 
change because now Engine 2 is supplying electrical power to three paths and 
Engine 1 is supplying one path, whereas from 0-400s both engines were 
supplying two paths each.  From the graph we can see that now Machine 4, 
(Generator 4) is supplying double the output power. 
 Perhaps a more significant graph is the Available Power at the routing 
nodes.  The available power is determined by the different of the power being 
generated upstream to that of the power drawn by loads downstream.  So for 
Routing Node 3, the available power is the difference between the power being 
generated by Generator 1, and the power being consumed by Load 1 and 
Machine 5 (TRU 5).  
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Figure 21: Machine Power and Efficiency 
 The tool has several outputs, of which these graphs are just a few. An 
aircraft designer may be most interested in parameters such as Fuel Flow in 
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Figure 23 or Available Power in Figure 22.  The analysis performed hereafter will 
mostly be concerned with Available Power.  As previously discussed, analyzing 
available power will assist aircraft designers in sizing problems.  Markov analysis 
is first used to determine which states are most likely to occur.  The Tool can 
then be used to simulate a reconfiguration event to reach that state.  In that state, 
data on the available power may be collected.  Using the state with the worst 
case available power, the generator can be downsized to minimize the excess 
Available Power. 
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Figure 22: Available Power at Routing Nodes 
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Figure 23: Engine Performance 
HyPSO ADD-ON DESCRIPTION 
Before Markov analysis may be performed on the system, the system 
needs to be built and described in HyPSO.  It begins in yEd, with the custom 
palette previously described.  See Appendix A and Appendix B for the yEd 
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architectures with HyPSO numbering used for the analysis in this project.  These 
architectures are imported into HyPSO, and the Tool automatically parses and 
creates the simulation environment.  The only manual input required is the 
machine efficiency curves and the enabling of Available Power calculations 
discussed in the HyPSO Setup section. 
The procedure for performing Markov analysis will be performed in the 
following steps: 
1. Generate state space with state probabilities 
2. Display in MATLAB data structure 
3. Identify trivial and collapsible states 
4. Collapse state space by summing state probabilities 
5. Determine available power and load availability and attach to collapsed 
states 
6. Generate data visualizations 
These steps will now be discussed in detail: 
1. GENERATE STATE SPACE 
Using the Symbolic Math Toolbox provided by MATLAB, the system of 
differential equations may be solved.  This is achieved in the stProb.m function 
(see Appendix E.3).  Given the system state space structure and the number of 
flight hours to simulate over, this function will computer the probability of each 
state being reached over the number of flight hours.  Flight hours can also be 
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input as an array (a MATLAB row vector) to simulate over several ranges of flight 
hours at the same time.  
2. DISPLAY IN MATLAB DATA STRUCTURE 
 Next, in MATLAB, a data structure is used to store and organize the 
system description.  The data structure is built in buildSys.m (see Appendix E.2).  
The data structure is formatted as a tree.  The top level of the tree is the nominal 
system state with no failures.  It contains the probability that no failures will occur 
over the flight hours  The next level of the tree is the state of the system after a 
single failure.  Each of these states contains an equation representing the 
probability that the state will occur after a number of flight hours.  The three level 
of the tree is the state of the system after three failures.  At the moment, this data 
structure only contains three levels.  However, it would be genericized to include 
more levels, each new level representing a new failure. 
3. IDENTIFY TRIVIAL AND COLLAPSIBLE STATES 
 The rules for collapsing states are discussed in the Markov Analysis 
section.  A MATLAB script is written to execute these rules in elimTrivial.m seen 
in Appendix E.5. 
4. COLLAPSE STATE SPACE BY SUMMING PROBABILITIES 
 The collapsible states identified in step 3 are then combined in the 
MATLAB data structure.  To combine the states, the probabilities of being in the 
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collapsible states are summed.  The MATLAB script that performs this summing 
is aggregate.m seen in Appendix E.6. 
5. DETERMINE AVAILABLE POWER AND LOAD AVAILABILITY 
 The next step is to extract the Available Power and load availability data 
from the HyPSO simulation and attach it to the data structure.  First, the HyPSO 
simulation should be run to generate the required data.  The failure and 
reconfiguration events are auto-populated in the Tool using the statusize.m script 
in Appendix E.8.  Next, the output of the simulator is parsed and attached to the 
data structure built in steps 1-4.  This action is performed by getPwrAvail.m seen 
in Appendix E.7.  Since HyPSO is also developed in MATLAB, it is a simple task 
to extract the output of the simulator and attach it to the data structure such that 
the relationship between the state space and available power may be 
determined. 
6. GENERATE DATA VISUALIZATIONS 
 Now that the data structure has been built by creating the state space, 
collapsing the sate space, running a HyPSO simulation, and parsing the output 
data, we need a method to view the data in a comprehendible way.  MATLAB 
has strong graphing tools that were employed for this purpose.  Several data 
visualizations were developed and shall be discussed in the next section.  The 
data visualization MATLAB code is seen in Appendix E.9 through Appendix E.14. 
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V. EXAMPLE ANALYTICAL APPROACH 
SMALL TEST ARCHITECTURE 
 This method was tested on the small test architecture of Figure 8.  The 
test was performed with the failure rates given in Table 4: 
Table 4: Failure Rates for Small Test Architecture Test # 1 
Type 
MACH1 
MACH2 
MACH3 
MACH4 
BUS1 
BUS2 
BUS3 
BUS4 
Name 
GEN1 
GEN2 
TRU1 
TRU2 
AC1 
AC2 
DC1 
DC2 
Fail 
Rate 
7E-4 8E-5 1E-6 1E-6 
 
 After aggregation but before eliminating trivial states, a diagram of the 
state space is generated, as in Figure 24.  This figure shows the probabilities that 
each state in the state space will occur after 10 flight hours.  It is color coded by 
rate of occurrence.  Note that the “Probability of Failure” axis is on a logarithmic 
scale.  From this diagram it is clear that if a particular aircraft has a 10 hour route, 
either Machine 1 or Machine 2 (Generators 1 or  2) will fail frequently.  In a 
slightly more frightening case, it is reasonably probable that both Machines 1 and 
2 will fail at the same time.  It is also reasonably probable that either TRU 1 or 
TRU 2 (Machines 3 or 4) will fail.  All other states are remote or for all practical 
purposes will never occur.  This diagram is useful for seeing which states should 
be focused on and planned for.  If designers know that it is reasonably probable 
that Generators 1 and 2 can fail at the same time, then a mitigation plan can be 
developed. 
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Figure 24: Aggregated State Space for Small Test Architecture (10 flight hours) 
 In Figure 25, the probability of at least one load not being serviced with 
power is shown over time.  After 10 flight hours, there is a 9*10^-5 chance, or 
about 1 in 11,000 chance that an electrical load will be without power.  For a 10 
hour route, if the failure rates remain constant than at least one flight in 11,000 
will see a load failure.  
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Figure 25: At Least One Unserviced Load in Small Test Architecture 
 Figure 26 displays probabilities over a much longer time period.  This view 
could be useful for scheduling maintenance on the aircraft generators.  Since 
Figure 24 showed that we will frequently encounter generator failures, we can 
see exactly how much time it will take to almost guarantee a generator failure.  
Note that the Probability axis is on a logarithmic scale.  The probability that there 
will be absolutely no failure on the aircraft decreases logarithmically.  At about 
500 flight hours is a critical point: this is when there is a higher probability that 
there will be at least 1 generator failure becomes greater than no failure 
occurring at all.  Perhaps at this point generator maintenance should be 
scheduled.  Also notice how the chance of only one generator failure actually 
decreases in time after an inflection point at about 1000 flight hours.  This is 
because it is becoming more likely that there will be additional failures, so the 
single failure state would transition to a multiple failure state. 
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Figure 26: Small Test Architecture, No Fails and Generator Fails 
 Figure 27 takes into consideration both the load availability and the 
Available Power at each of the generators for each of the single failure states.  
For the small test architecture, the only way a single failure can cause a load 
outage is if the bus bar that the load is attached to fails.  According to this 
hypothetical system, bus bars are resilient systems that don’t fail as often as the 
machines.  The low probability of the load outage occurring makes it less 
significant of a consideration when designing redundancy into the network. 
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Figure 27: Load Availability and Available Power  
for Small Test Architecture (10 hours) 
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 In the second subplot, the available power for each of the generators is 
displayed.  This chart shows the difference from nominal.  For example, if 
Generator 1 usually has 80 kW of available power and it fails, there is now 80kW 
less available power than the nominal case.  Thus, -80kW available for 
Generator 1, and -20kW available for Generator 2 because it now has to 
compensate for the loads the Generator 1 used to be supplying.  In this example, 
Generator 1 had a maximum output power of 100kW.  After it fails there is a total 
of 100kW less power available in the network, which is why the available power 
of Generator 1 and Generator 2 add up to -100kW. 
 From Figure 27 it is apparent that either Generator 1 or 2 failing causes 
the highest deficit of available power.  When considering just one failure, this 
would be the “sizing case.”  The sizing case means that the generators would be 
sized based on how much available power there was in the network after one of 
the generators has failed.  
 It is also important to consider positive available power.  This means that 
there is more available power at the generator now than before the failure.  For 
the DC bus bar failure case, there is about 10kW more available power than 
before.  It can be inferred from this data that the 10kW load attached to the DC 
bus bar is no longer being serviced with power. 
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Figure 28: Single and Double Failures,  
Load Availability and Available Power (10 hours) 
 The plot in Figure 28 expands the plot from Figure 27 to include double 
failure states.  Here there is a full view of the architecture.  This plot will begin to 
get cluttered, however, as larger state spaces are considered. 
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 The state space shown in Figure 24 has a symmetric feel to it only 
because the failure rates provided for the systems are simple examples.  
Hypothetically, after a round of testing and FMEA, designers could find that DC 
Bus 2 (Bus 4) is particularly susceptible to failure and has a higher rate than 
other buses.  The state space is regenerated in Figure 29 using the values of 
Table 5 to provide a more realistic view of what a state space make look like in 
practice.  The advantage of viewing these plots in MATLAB is the ability to rotate 
the graph and get a full view of the system. 
Table 5: Failure Rates for Small Test Architecture Test # 2 
Type 
MACH1 
MACH2 
MACH3 
MACH4 
BUS1 
BUS2 
BUS3 
BUS4 
Name 
GEN1 
GEN2 
TRU1 
TRU2 
AC1 
AC2 
DC1 
DC2 
Fail 
Rate 
7E-4 
5E-4 
1.2E-4 
8E-5 
6E-6 
3E-6 
1E-6 
1E-3 
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Figure 29: Aggregated State Space #2 
FULL TEST ARCHITECTURE 
Figure 30 displays the state space for the full test architecture, previously 
shown in Figure 18.  The failure rates used for this run are the same as those 
used for the small test architecture in Table 4. 
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Figure 30: Aggregated State Space for Test Architecture 
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Figure 31: Load Availability and Available Power for Full Test Architecture 
 In Figure 31, the available power is now divided amongst the four 
generators, as opposed to 2 in the previous example.  There are too many states 
for the single and double failure plot (analogous to Figure 28) to be useful in this 
case. 
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 Compared to the smaller architecture, the full test architecture has a 
higher chance of having at least one load unserviced, as seen in Figure 32.  At 
the end of 10 flight hours, there is a 1.2E-4 probability, or about 1 in 8300, that a 
load will fail, compared to 1 in 11000 for the smaller architecture.  This is due to 
the fact that there are more ways in which a load can be unserviced.  For 
example, there are now 12 buses instead of 4, any if any one of the buses fail 
then a load is unserviced.  If all of the buses on both architectures are said to fail 
at the same rate, then the architecture with 3 times as many buses will have a 3 
times higher chance of a load failing due to a bus failure. 
 
Figure 32: At Least One Unserviced Load in Full Test Architecture 
 These data visualization tools are useful for comparing two similar 
architectures to see which one is more advantageous.  They can be used as a 
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rating method to objectively determine which architecture is cheaper, safer, or 
both. 
 Electric power architecture designers must strike a balance between 
operating costs and safety/reliability.  Sufficient redundancy must be built into the 
network to ensure passenger safety.  However, too much redundancy will 
unnecessarily add excess weight to the aircraft, significantly increasing operating 
costs.  Contactors in particular are significant sources of weight.  If a contactor 
could be eliminated from the network without a significant increase in risk, then 
the aircraft manufacturer could increase its competitiveness in the marketplace 
by lowering operating costs. 
 To see if contactors can be eliminated safely, the test architecture of 
Figure 18 will be modified to remove Reconfigurable Paths 5 and 8.  This is 
equivalent to removing two contactors from the network.  The modified 
architecture is given in Figure 33.  The HyPSO numbering matches the reference 
given in Appendix B.  
 For this analysis, only the states in which Reconfigurable Paths 5 and 8 
are closed are needed.  All other data will remain the same.  The probability of 
reaching a state in which these paths would be closed remains the same, since 
the system components and failure rates do not change.  The main variable that 
will change is the available power.  Figure 34 can be directly compared to Figure 
31.  By running multiple simulations on slightly modified architectures, designers 
can determine which architecture is superior. 
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Figure 33: Modified Full Test Architecture 
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Figure 34: Available Loads and Power for Modified Full Test Architecture 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
 As more research and development is performed in the aerospace 
industry in the field of More Electric Aircraft, better tools are needed to analyze 
increasingly complex aircraft electric power systems.  Airbus developed the 
HyPSO tool to simulate hybrid power systems.  There are many outputs to the 
Tool,, one of which is the Available Power at bus bars.  Available power is an 
important parameter in the sizing of electric power systems.  The Tool is capable 
of simulating failures in various power systems, and reconfiguring the power 
system as would be done in an actual failure scenario.  This feature was 
employed heavily in the analysis performed in this project.   
 To predict which types of failures would be most common, and thus of 
most concern and deserving of the most attention, Markov analysis was 
performed.  A state space was created assuming a few failure modes.  
Transitioning between states occurs when a failure occurs.  The probability of 
being in each state was calculated.  An add-on to the HyPSO tool was created in 
MATLAB to perform the calculations involved in Markov analysis.  The add-on is 
structured around a tree data structure which contains each of the states in the 
state space.  MATLAB solves the system of ordinary differential equations – one 
equation representing each state in the state space.  The solution to the set of 
equations is the probability that a state will be reached in a certain amount of 
time.  The data structure stores the equation associated with each state with 
respect to time t, so several time values may be input, generating probability over 
time.  The add-on generates failure and reconfiguration events and 
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auto-populates the events into HyPSO.  Once a HyPSO simulation is run, data 
associated with each failure and reconfiguration event is parsed and stored in the 
data structure in the state associated with the event.  
 In an actual analysis of a real aircraft power system, the architecture input 
into HyPSO is likely to be much more complex than the architectures analyzed in 
this project.  In addition, several more failure modes may be programmed into the 
add-on.  In this case, there may be massive amounts of data generated and 
stored into the data structure.  To assist in data analysis, several data 
visualizations were created in MATLAB.  These data visualizations help the user 
to draw connections between probable failure states and the Available Power in 
these states.  Two use cases were performed, where the data visualizations 
were employed to analyze a small and a full test architecture.  The data 
visualizations were helpful in predicting when a critical failure would occur, or 
when an electrical load would be without power.  They can also be used for other 
purposes, such as scheduling generator maintenance.  Finally, plots of Available 
Power were developed to be used for power system sizing. 
Available Power is the primary parameter involved in sizing of aircraft 
power systems.  Using the data structure created as an add-on to HyPSO tool, 
aircraft designers can determine which failure states are most likely to occur.  
Using the existing output of HyPSO, which is parsed into the data structure by 
the add-on, designers may determine the Available Power at the generator in 
these likely-to-occur states.  They may then size the generators appropriately so 
that as many electrical loads as possible are serviced during a failure.  If a 
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generator may be down-sized, weight is saved in the aircraft, thereby reducing 
the amount of fuel during flight.  When fuel is saved, operating costs are 
decreased, and the aircraft manufacturer can gain a competitive advantage in the 
marketplace. 
FURTHER RESEARCH  
 HyPSO could benefit from several changes and additions to the software.  
First, a better mechanism to cause the failure of bus bars (routing nodes) should 
be implemented.  For this project, the main input power path was disconnected 
(set to zero) in order to fail the routing nodes.  This method could cause errors if 
the routing node is connected to another source of power, especially another 
routing node.  The automatic failure feature built in this add-on does not check for 
other input power paths to the routing node.  In reality, if a bus bar fails, nothing 
can supply or be supplied by the bus bar.  It is not sufficient to say that the input 
power path is failed. 
 Secondly, the Tool could benefit from a “load availability” feature.  Instead 
of just declaring that the simulation constraints have been violated, report the 
number of loads that are unable to be supplied with power, or the magnitude of 
the power shortage.  It appears that there is no correlation to the values in 
opt.constrVio and the amount of the actual power shortage.  Thus, only a binary 
output can be inferred: if there is a constraint violation, then there must be at 
least one load that is not properly supplied with power, and if there is no 
constraint violation, all loads are supplied with power. 
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 The add-on developed in this project could be expanded to extend its 
functionality.  The simplest and most effective expansion would be the addition of 
new data visualizations.  The user may be interested in different results other 
than those presented here.  With the provided data structure, simple 
manipulations can assist the user in better understanding the system under test.  
The add-on may be expanded to include three or more failure states.  
 The Markov chain presented here is non-recoverable.  When a state is 
entered, it is not possible to return to the original state.  In reality, systems are 
repairable.  There is a chance that the system can return to a previous state.  
This return is described by a transition rate, same as the progression transition 
rates used in this analysis.  Repairable systems as described in ARP4761 [9] 
could be implemented in this add-on.  Since HyPSO mostly centers around 
mission-based simulations, e.g. a single flight at a time, this project did not cover 
repairable systems, which is more of an aircraft lifecycle or up-time concern.  
 This method could be useful if built on the MATLAB Simulink platform.  A 
Simulink block could describe a state, then connections between the blocks 
would be described by transition rates.  In this way, a state space could be built 
in as a block diagram, with the back-end code hidden to the user.  This would 
greatly assist in the usability of the add-on and in the comprehension of the 
complex state space of the system. 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A - SMALL TEST ARCHITECTURE 
A.1 - HyPSO NUMBERING 
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APPENDIX B - LARGE TEST ARCHITECTURE 
B.1 - MINIMAL HyPSO NUMBERING 
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B.2 - FULL HyPSO NUMBERING 
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APPENDIX C – HONEYWELL HVAC EPS [15] 
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APPENDIX D – HONEYWELL HVDC EPS [16] 
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APPENDIX E – MATLAB CODE 
E.1 – “main.m” 
% Set up workspace 
clear 
%load('small_test_arch_workspace_full.mat'); 
%load('test_arch_workspace.mat') 
load('small_test_woeng_workspace.mat'); 
 
%close the GUI when it opens after opening the workspace 
close force all 
 
 
% USER INPUT VALUE - integer or row vector 
% Number of flight hours over which to generate the state 
% probabilities. This value may also be obtained from the Mission tab 
% in the HyPSO tool. 
%   Example: 
% simFlightHours = sum(H.f2tMISStable.Data(:,7))/360; 
%    Calculates the state probabilities for the same length as the 
%    current HyPSO mission. 
% If a Row vector is input, state probabilities will be generated for 
% multiple time values. 
%   Example: 
% simFlightHours = 1:100; 
%    Generates a row vector with 100 time steps incrementing by 1. 
simFlightHours = 1:10; 
 
% USER INPUT VALUES - logical true/false 
% User decided whether to include engines, machines, and buses in the 
% failure simulations. If the system is included, it MUST have a 
% corresponding FailRate column vector. If includeBuses is true, the 
% busTypes and busInputPaths below must be declared for each bus for 
% which failures are to be simulated. 
includeEngines = false; 
includeMachines = true; 
includeBuses = true; 
 
% USER INPUT VALUE - logical true/false 
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% When reporting the available power, take the difference from nominal 
% available power. 
takePwrDiffFromNom = true; 
 
% USER INPUT VALUE - column vectors 
% Since buses are abstracted to routing nodes in HyPSO, we can declare 
% bus names individually for clarity. Input as column cell array. User 
% must declare the bus's main power input path in busInputPath. This 
% is the path that will be turned to 0 when the bus is supposed to 
% fail. 
% 
% ASSUMPTIONS 
% 1 Routing nodes are numbered in the same sequence as they are 
%   declared below! 
% 2 busInputPath is a column vector containing path numbers that are 
%   in corresponding order with busTypes 
busTypes = {'AC'; 'AC'; 'DC'; 'DC'}; 
busInputPath = [3; 4; 9; 10]; 
% busTypes = {'AC';'AC';'AC';'AC';'DC';'DC';'DC';'DC';... 
%             'ACESS';'ACSHED';'DCESS';'DCSHED'}; 
% busInputPath = [7; 8; 9; 10; 29; 30; 32; 33; 19; 26; 37; 41]; 
 
 
% USER INPUT VALUE - column vectors 
% This variable can be added to the Engine tab in HyPSO 
% Each component set to fail needs a specific fail rates 
% Input fail rates in the same order as the components are numbers 
%engFailRates = [ 1E-7; 1E-7 ]; 
% machFailRates = [ linspace(7E-4,10E-4,length(simFlightHours));... 
%                   linspace(7E-4,10E-4,length(simFlightHours));... 
%                   linspace(8E-5,12E-5,length(simFlightHours));... 
%                   linspace(8E-5,12E-5,length(simFlightHours))]; 
% busFailRates = [  linspace(1E-6,1E-6,length(simFlightHours));... 
%                   linspace(1E-6,1E-6,length(simFlightHours));... 
%                   linspace(1E-6,1E-6,length(simFlightHours));... 
%                   linspace(1E-6,1E-6,length(simFlightHours))]; 
machFailRates = [7E-4;7E-4;8E-5;8E-5]; 
busFailRates = [1E-6;1E-6;1E-6;1E-6]; 
% engFailRates = [1E-7;1E-7]; 
% machFailRates = [8E-4;5E-4;6E-4;7E-4;1E-5;9E-5;3E-5;8E-5]; 
% busFailRates = [1E-7;7E-7;1E-6;4E-7;1E-6;... 
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%                 9E-7;3E-6;4E-7;1E-8;1E-7;2E-8;3E-7]; 
 
 
% Build the sys struct that describes the architecture 
buildSys; 
% Construct state probability data structure 
states = stProb_rev4 ( sys, simFlightHours ); 
% Add together redundant states 
states = aggregate(states); 
% Eliminate trivial 2fail states 
states = elimTrivial(states,'Generator','AC','Transformer'); 
% Correct status numbers on each of the states 
[states,H.f2tSTATgARCHtable.Data] = statusize(states, busInputPath,... 
    numEng, numMach, H.f2tSTATgARCHtable.Data); 
% Attach available power from HyPSO simulation to the states struct 
states = getPwrAvail(states, route, path, takePwrDiffFromNom); 
 
% Clean up interface and workspace 
clear busInputPath sys simFlightHours 
clear numEng numMach takePwrDiffFromNom 
 
E.2 – “buildSys.m” 
%--------------------------------- 
% This script builds a system struct that contains all of the 
% pertinent information about the system architecture that is needed 
% to create the state space. This information is taken directly from 
% the HyPSO tool GUI - the tables in the H struct. Data describing the 
% engines and machines are taken from H.f2tENGtable.Data and 
% H.f2tMACHtable.Data respectively. 
% 
% User must choose to include engines, machines, and buses in the 
% failure state space in main.m by setting includeEng, includeMach, 
% and include.Bus. 
% 
% ASSSUMPTIONS 
% A HyPSO simulation has already been run with the model under test so 
% that the workspace is populated with the H struct. 
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%--------------------------------- 
 
 
% Build system architecture struct 
sys = struct('sub',[],'subnum',[],'type',[],'num',[],'rate',[]); 
 
% Create vectors for counting the unique subsystem types 
sysType = unique( [H.f2tMACHtable.Data(:,9); ... 
                   H.f2tENGtable.Data(:,2); busTypes] ); 
sysCount = ones(size(sysType,1),1); 
 
% Build engine section 
numEng = size(H.f2tENGtable.Data,1); 
if includeEng 
    for x = 1:numEng 
        sys(x).sub = 'ENG'; 
        sys(x).subnum = x; 
        sys(x).type = H.f2tENGtable.Data(x,2); 
        sys(x).rate = engFailRates(x,:); 
        % Keep a running tally of the number of engine types 
        %(i.e. 'Turbofan') 
        [~,y] = ismember(sys(x).type,sysType); 
        sys(x).num = sysCount(y); 
        sysCount(y) = sysCount(y) + 1; 
    end 
end 
 
% Build machine section 
numMach = size(H.f2tMACHtable.Data,1); 
if includeMach 
    for x = 1:numMach 
        sys(x+numEng).sub = 'MACH'; 
        sys(x+numEng).subnum = x; 
        sys(x+numEng).type = H.f2tMACHtable.Data(x,9); 
        sys(x+numEng).rate = machFailRates(x,:); 
        % Keep a running tally of the number of machine types 
        % (i.e. 'Generator', 'Transformer') 
        [~,y] = ismember(sys(x+numEng).type,sysType); 
        sys(x+numEng).num = sysCount(y); 
        sysCount(y) = sysCount(y) + 1; 
    end 
86 
end 
 
% Build bus section 
if includeBus 
    for x = 1:size(busTypes,1) 
        sys(x+numEng+numMach).sub = 'BUS'; 
        sys(x+numEng+numMach).subnum = x; 
        sys(x+numEng+numMach).type = busTypes(x); 
        sys(x+numEng+numMach).rate = busFailRates(x,:); 
        % Keep a running tally of the number of bus types 
        % (i.e. 'AC', 'DC', 'HVDC', 'ACESS') 
        [~,y] = ismember(sys(x+numEng+numMach).type,sysType); 
        sys(x+numEng+numMach).num = sysCount(y); 
        sysCount(y) = sysCount(y) + 1; 
    end 
end 
 
%clean up the workspace 
clear x y sysType sysCount busTypes 
clear engFailRates machFailRates busFailRates 
clear includeEng includeMach includeBus 
%------------------------------- 
 
E.3 – “stProb.m”  
function [ states ] = stProb_rev4( sys, flightHours) 
% stProb This function builds and solves the differential equations to 
% find the state probability of each of the possible states in the 
% system. Using the system description built in buildSys.m,  
 
rates = repmat([sys(:).rate]',1,size(sys,2)+1); 
rates((size(sys,2)+1):(size(sys,2)+1): end) = 0; 
 
count = size(sys,2); 
states = 
struct('type','NOM','P',[],'tsimhrs',flightHours,'status',1,'avail',[],
'f1',[]); 
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syms P(t) double 
states.P = dsolve(diff(P) == 0 - sum(rates(:,1))*P, P(0) == 1); 
 
states.f1 = deal(sys); 
for x = 1:count 
    states.f1(x).P = dsolve(diff(P) == sum(rates(x,1) .* states.P) - 
sum(rates(:,x+1))*P, P(0) == 0); 
    states.f1(x).f2 = deal(sys); 
    for y = 1:count 
        states.f1(x).f2(y).P = dsolve(diff(P) == sum(rates(y,x+1) .* 
states.f1(x).P), P(0) == 0); 
    end 
end 
 
nEval = length(flightHours); 
 
for x = 0:nEval-1 
    states.P(nEval-x) = subs(states.P(1), t, flightHours(nEval-x)); 
end 
states.P = eval(states.P); 
for x = 1:count 
    for y = 0:nEval-1 
        states.f1(x).P(nEval-y) = subs(states.f1(x).P(1), t, 
flightHours(nEval-y)); 
    end 
    states.f1(x).P = eval(states.f1(x).P); 
    for y = 1:count 
        for z = 0:nEval-1 
        states.f1(x).f2(y).P(nEval-z) = subs(states.f1(x).f2(y).P(1), 
t, flightHours(nEval-z)); 
        end 
        states.f1(x).f2(y).P = eval(states.f1(x).f2(y).P); 
    end 
end 
end 
E.4 – “checksum.m” 
function [  ] = checksum( states ) 
%checksum Checks the sum of all the state probabilities in the system 
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% state data structure to ensure they add up to one. Due to precision 
% error in double floating point arithmatic, the error may be 
% non-zero. Typical errors are less than 1E-14, a negligible amount. 
% Enter eps(1) for the smallest incremental value after 1 for a double 
% floating point number. 
% 
% INPUTS 
% states The system state probability data structure 
 
% Subtract the nominal state probability 
error = ones(1,length(states.P)) - states.P; 
 
% Subtract 1f and 2f state probabilities 
for x = 1:size(states.f1,2); 
    error = error - states.f1(x).P; 
    for y = 1:size(states.f1(x).f2,2) 
        error = error - states.f1(x).f2(y).P; 
    end 
end 
 
% Throw an error message if error = |sum(P) - 1| is greater than a 
% negligable amount of 1E-14 
for x = 1:length(error) 
    assert(abs(error(x))<1E-14,... 
    'Sum of state prob error from 1 greater than |1E-14|: P(%d)=%e'... 
    , x, error(x)) 
end 
 
end 
 
E.5 – “elimTrivial.m” 
function [ states ] = elimTrivial( states, inMach, bus, outMach ) 
%elimTrivial elimiates trivial architecture states from the state 
% space. A trivial state is one that the same load availability, 
% available power, and configuration as a previous state. This occurs 
% when a machine fails that was supplying, or supplied by, an already 
% failed bus. 
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% 
% Example: A state where AC1 bus fails has the same configuration, 
% available power, and load availability as: 
% 
% 1) A state where AC1 bus and GEN1 fails 
% 2) A state where AC1 bus and TRU1 fails 
% 
% INPUTS 
% state The architecture state space data structure 
% inMach A string containing the name of the input machine 
% bus A string containing the name of the intermediary bus 
% outMach A string containing the name of the output machine 
% Example 
% inMach = 'Generator' 
% bus = 'AC' 
% outMach = 'Transformer' 
% 
% OUTPUTS 
% state The updated architecture state space data structure with 
%   eliminated trivial states 
% 
% ASSUMPTIONS 
% The inMach supplying power to the bus, and the outMach supplied by 
% the bus have the same num 
 
 
% Check each single fail state, looking for the inMach or outMach 
for x = 1:size(states.f1,2) 
    if strcmp(states.f1(x).type, inMach) ||... 
       strcmp(states.f1(x).type, outMach) 
        % Store the number of the inMach or outMach 
        num = states.f1(x).num; 
        % Find the struct index of the 1 bus fail state. The bus has 
        % the same num as the inMach/outMach 
        y = find(strcmp([states.f1(:).type], bus) &... 
                 [states.f1(:).num] == num); 
        % Find the struct index of the trivial 2fail state 
        z = find(strcmp([states.f1(x).f2(:).type], bus) &... 
                 [states.f1(x).f2(:).num] == num); 
        % Add the 2fail state probability to the 1fail state 
        states.f1(y).P = states.f1(y).P + states.f1(x).f2(z).P; 
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        % Delete the 2fail state 
        states.f1(x).f2(z) = []; 
    end 
end 
 
checksum(states); 
end 
 
E.6 – “aggregate.m” 
function [ states ] = aggregate( states ) 
%aggregate This function combines obvious identical system states. For 
% example - it combines the state where GEN1 fails, then GEN2 fails 
% with the state where GEN2 fails, then GEN1 fails. It doesn't matter 
% which path the systemt took to reach the state - it will have the 
% same system configuration and characteristics. Therefore, we can 
% combine the states by adding their probabilities. 
 
 
count = size(states.f1,2); 
 
% Add the probabilities of the identical 2 fail states together 
for x = 1:count 
    for y = x+1:count 
        states.f1(x).f2(y).P = states.f1(x).f2(y).P +... 
                               states.f1(y).f2(x).P; 
    end 
end 
 
% Delete the entry of the duplicate 2 fail state. 
for x = 1:count 
    for y = 1:x 
        states.f1(x).f2(1) = []; 
    end 
end 
 
checksum(states); 
end 
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E.7 – “getPwrAvail.m” 
function [ states ] = getPwrAvail( states, route, path, takeDiff ) 
%getPwrAvail parses the available power from the HyPSO simulation and 
%attaches it to the states data structure. 
% 
% 
% INPUTS 
% states The architecture state space data structure 
% route The route data structure generated by the HyPSO simulation 
% path The path data structure generated by the HyPSO simulation 
% takeDiff Logical integer choosing whether to take the difference 
%   from nominal before attaching the available power 
% 
% OUTPUTS 
% state The updated architecture state space data structure with 
%    attached available power 
 
 
%--------------------------------------------------- 
% This section identifies when two routing nodes are connected 
% together. Only checks routing nodes that have report available power 
% enabled (route.checkPwr). This corrects the error where both routing 
% nodes will report the same available power when they are connected 
% together. In reality, only one node should have that available 
% power, and the other node is just drawing from the first 
 
%initialize variables 
outPaths = []; 
inPaths = []; 
for x = 1:route.n 
    %Only check routing nodes with report available power enabled 
    if route.checkPwr(x) 
        %Create an array of all input and output paths 
        outPaths = [ outPaths,route.pathOut(1,x) ]; 
        inPaths = [ inPaths,route.pathIn(1,x) ]; 
    end 
end 
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% This loop finds the input and output paths between routing nodes 
% with check available power enabled 
for x = 1:route.n 
    %Only check routing nodes that have report available power enabled 
    if route.checkPwr(x) 
        % Check if an output or input path corresponds to another node 
        % with available power enabled. 
        in(x)  = {intersect( cell2mat( route.pathIn(1,x) ),... 
                             cell2mat( outPaths ))}; 
        out(x) = {intersect( cell2mat( route.pathOut(1,x) ),... 
                             cell2mat( inPaths ))}; 
    else 
        % If checkPwr not true, leave an empty cell in the array 
        in(x)  = {[]}; 
        out(x) = {[]}; 
    end 
end 
 
% Convert from a cell array to a matrix 
in  = ~cellfun( @isempty,in ); 
out = ~cellfun( @isempty,out ); 
%-------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
%Create a copy of the available power table 
availDiff = route.pwrAvail; 
 
% 
for x = 1:size(states.f1,2) 
    temp = states.f1(x).status; 
    for y = 1:size(availDiff,2) 
        if in(y)  && path.status( temp, in(y) ) ==  1 ||... 
           out(y) && path.status( temp, out(y)) == -1 
 
            availDiff(temp,y) = 0; 
        end 
    end 
    for z = 1:size(states.f1(x).f2,2) 
        temp = states.f1(x).f2(z).status; 
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        for y = 1:size(availDiff,2) 
            if in(y)  && path.status( temp, in(y) ) ==  1 ||... 
               out(y) && path.status( temp, out(y)) == -1 
 
                availDiff(temp,y) = 0; 
            end 
        end 
    end 
end 
 
% Delete cells that have Not A Number (NaN) in them 
availDiff = availDiff( :, ~isnan( availDiff(1,:) )); 
availDiff = availDiff( ~isnan( availDiff(:,1) ), :); 
 
% Take the difference between the nominal available power and each 
% state. Each state will now contain the difference from nominal. 
% Nominal remains unchanged. User Enabled 
if takeDiff 
    for col = 1:size(availDiff,2) 
        availDiff(2:end, col) = availDiff(2:end, col) -... 
                                availDiff(1,col); 
    end 
end 
 
 
% Assign nominal available power to states data structure 
states.avail = availDiff(1,:); 
 
% Assign available power to all other states in data structure 
for x = 1:size(states.f1,2) 
    states.f1(x).avail = availDiff( states.f1(x).status, : ); 
    for y = 1:size( states.f1(x).f2, 2 ) 
        states.f1(x).f2(y).avail = ... 
            availDiff( states.f1(x).f2(y).status, : ); 
    end 
end 
 
end 
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E.8 – “statusize.m” 
function [states,atable,etable] = statusize(states,paths,numEng,... 
                                            numMach,atable,etable) 
%statusize This function builds the architecture states on the status tab. 
% It assigns each state in the architecture states data structure a 
% "status" that denotes the corresponding architecture status in the HyPSO 
% tool. It sets the appropriate components to fail, depending on the 
% architecture state. In order to fail bus bars, this function sets the 
% main power input path to fail. The user must choose which input path is 
% the main input path that will fail the bus bar. 
% 
% Inputs 
% states The architecture states data structureW 
% paths The main power input paths that will fail in order to cause a bus 
%   bar failure. The paths MUST be in the same order as the subnum 
%   numbering for the BUS sub. 
% numEng The number of engines 
% numMach The number of machines 
% atable The HyPSO GUI status arch table H.f2tSTATgARCHtable.Data 
% etable The HyPSO GUI status event table H.f2tSTATgEVNTtable1.Data 
 
 
count = size(states.f1,2); 
status = 2; 
for x = 1:count 
    states.f1(x).status = status; 
    atable{status,1} = strcat(states.f1(x).sub, num2str(states.f1(x).subnum)); 
    if strcmp(states.f1(x).sub,'ENG') 
        atable{status,states.f1(x).subnum + 1} = 0; 
    elseif strcmp(states.f1(x).sub,'MACH') 
        atable{status,states.f1(x).subnum + numEng + 1} = 0; 
    else 
        atable{status,paths(states.f1(x).subnum) + numEng + numMach + 3} = 0; 
    end 
    status = status + 1; 
end 
 
for x = 1:count 
    for y = 1:size(states.f1(x).f2,2) 
        if strcmp(states.f1(x).sub,'ENG') 
            atable{status,states.f1(x).subnum + 1} = 0; 
        elseif strcmp(states.f1(x).sub,'MACH') 
            atable{status,states.f1(x).subnum + numEng + 1} = 0; 
        else 
            atable{status,paths(states.f1(x).subnum) + numEng + numMach + 3} = 0; 
        end 
 
        states.f1(x).f2(y).status = status; 
        atable{status,1} = strcat(states.f1(x).sub, num2str(states.f1(x).subnum), 
states.f1(x).f2(y).sub, num2str(states.f1(x).f2(y).subnum)); 
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        if strcmp(states.f1(x).f2(y).sub,'ENG') 
            atable{status,states.f1(x).f2(y).subnum + 1} = 0; 
        elseif strcmp(states.f1(x).f2(y).sub,'MACH') 
            atable{status,states.f1(x).f2(y).subnum + numEng + 1} = 0; 
        else 
            atable{status,paths(states.f1(x).f2(y).subnum) + numEng + numMach + 3} = 0; 
        end 
 
        status = status + 1; 
    end 
end 
status = status - 1; 
[etable(1,1:status)] = deal(num2cell(linspace(0,(status-1)*100,status))); 
[etable(2,1:status)] = deal(num2cell(linspace(1,status,status))); 
 
checksum(states); 
end 
 
E.9 – “nom_prob_vs_time.m”  
function clear 
load('states_plot_test.mat'); 
y = states.P; 
x = states.tsimhrs; 
plot(x,y,'r'); 
hold on 
plot(states.tsimhrs,states.f1(1).P,'g') 
%barColorMap = hot(8); 
%set(h,'FaceColor', barColorMap(1,:)); 
plot(states.tsimhrs,states.f1(1).P + sum(vertcat(states.f1(1).f2(:).P)),'b'); 
 
title('Probability of No Failures Over Time'); 
ax = gca; 
ax.YScale = 'log'; 
 
ax.XLim = [0 10000]; 
ax.YLim = [0 1]; 
 
h.BarWidth = 0.2; 
 
ax.XTickMode = 'auto'; 
%ax.XTick = [1 10 100 1000]; 
ax.YTickMode = 'auto'; 
%ax.YTick = 0:0.1:1; 
%ax.XTickLabel = num2str(states.tsimhrs); 
 
ax.YGrid = 'on'; 
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ax.YMinorGrid = 'on'; 
ax.XGrid = 'on'; 
 
ylabel('State Probability'); 
xlabel('Flight Time (hours)'); 
 
E.10 – “precentServiced.m” 
 
Pserv = states.P; 
Punserv = zeros(1,length(states.P)); 
 
for x = 1:size(states.f1,2) 
    if opt.constrVio(states.f1(x).status) > 0.1 
        Punserv = Punserv + states.f1(x).P; 
    else 
        Pserv = Pserv + states.f1(x).P; 
    end 
    for y = 1:size(states.f1(x).f2,2) 
        if opt.constrVio(states.f1(x).f2(y).status) > 0.1 
            Punserv = Punserv + states.f1(x).f2(y).P; 
        else 
            Pserv = Pserv + states.f1(x).f2(y).P; 
        end 
    end 
end 
figure 
plot(1:length(Punserv),Punserv); 
title('Probability of At Least One Load Unserviced'); 
ylabel('Probability'); 
xlabel('Flight Hours'); 
 
set(gca,'YGrid','on',... 
        'YMinorGrid','on',... 
        'XGrid','on'); 
 
clear Pserv Punserv x y  
         
 
E.11 – “bar_3d.m” 
 
Pf = vertcat(states.f1(:).P); 
Pf(:,1:9) = []; 
min = min(Pf); 
%P2f = zeros(size(states.f1,2));  
for x = 1:size(states.f1,2) 
    for y = 1:size(states.f1(x).f2,2) 
        Pf(y,x+1) =  states.f1(x).f2(y).P(10); 
        if Pf(y,x+1) < min 
            min = Pf(y,x+1); 
        end 
    end 
end 
Pf = Pf'; 
figure 
h1 = bar3(nan(size(Pf))); 
set(h1,'FaceColor',[1 0 0]); 
hold on 
h2 = bar3(nan(size(Pf))); 
set(h2,'FaceColor',[1 0.8 0.2]); 
hold on 
h3 = bar3(nan(size(Pf))); 
set(h3,'FaceColor',[1 1 0]); 
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hold on 
h4 = bar3(nan(size(Pf))); 
set(h4,'FaceColor',[0 1 0]); 
hold on 
h5 = bar3(nan(size(Pf))); 
set(h5,'FaceColor',[0 0 1]); 
hold on 
l = {'P>1E-3 frequent',... 
       '1E-3>P>1E-5 reasonably probable',... 
       '1E-5>P>1E-7 remote',... 
       '1E-7>P>1E-9 extremely remote',... 
       'P<1E-9 extremely improbable'}; 
legend([h1(1) h2(1) h3(1) h4(1) h5(1)],l,'Position',[0.685 0.772 0.258 0.155]); 
 
h = bar3(Pf); 
 
 
 
%--------------------- 
%This segment of code by Matt Fig posted to MATLAB support forums. 
%Allows access to individual bars to change facecolor. 
%http://www.mathworks.com/matlabcentral/ 
%    answers/5424-how-to-colorize-individual-bar-in-bar3 
% 
cm = get(gcf,'colormap');  % Use the current colormap. 
cnt = 0; 
for jj = 1:length(h) 
    xd = get(h(jj),'xdata'); 
    yd = get(h(jj),'ydata'); 
    zd = get(h(jj),'zdata'); 
    delete(h(jj))     
    idx = [0;find(all(isnan(xd),2))]; 
    if jj == 1 
        S = zeros(length(h)*(length(idx)-1),1); 
        dv = floor(size(cm,1)/length(S)); 
    end 
    for ii = 1:length(idx)-1 
        cnt = cnt + 1; 
        S(cnt) = surface(xd(idx(ii)+1:idx(ii+1)-1,:),... 
                         yd(idx(ii)+1:idx(ii+1)-1,:),... 
                         zd(idx(ii)+1:idx(ii+1)-1,:),... 
                         'facecolor',cm((cnt-1)*dv+1,:)); 
    end 
end 
%--------------------- 
 
for x = 1:size(Pf,1) 
    for y = 1:size(Pf,2) 
        color = [0 0 1]; 
        if Pf(y,x) > 1E-3 
            color = [1 0 0]; 
        elseif Pf(y,x) > 1E-5 
            color = [1 0.8 0.2]; 
        elseif Pf(y,x) > 1E-7 
            color = [1 1 0]; 
        elseif Pf(y,x) > 1E-9 
            color = [0 1 0]; 
        elseif Pf(y,x) == 0 
            color = [1 1 1]; 
            set(S((x-1)*size(Pf,2)+y),'edgecolor',[1 1 1]); 
        end 
        set(S((x-1)*size(Pf,2)+y),'facecolor',color); 
    end 
end 
 
title('Probability of Single and Double Failures'); 
xlabel('First Failure'); 
ylabel('Second Failure'); 
zlabel('Probability of Failure'); 
 
 
%--------------------- 
%This segment of code from Mathworks Support for correcting ZScale log 
%error on bar3 plots posted to MATLAB support forums 
%http://www.mathworks.com/matlabcentral/answers/100500-how-can-i-set- 
%      the-zscale-of-a-bar3-plot-to-logarithmic-in-matlab 
% 
b = get(gca,'Children'); 
for i = 1:length(b) 
98 
       ZData = get(b(i), 'ZData'); 
       ZData(ZData==0) = min/10; 
       set(b(i), 'ZData', ZData); 
end 
%-------------------- 
 
for x = 1:size(Pf,2) 
    xl{x} = strcat(states.f1(x).sub,num2str(states.f1(x).subnum)); 
end 
yl = xl; 
yl{1} = 'Only one failure'; 
set(gca,'ZScale','log',... 
        'ZLim',[min/10 1],... 
        'ZTick',[1E-9 1E-7 1E-5 1E-3 1],... 
        'XTick',1:size(Pf,2),... 
        'YTick',1:size(Pf,2),... 
        'YTickLabel',yl,... 
        'XTickLabel',xl,... 
        'YTickLabelRotation',35,... 
        'XTickLabelRotation',325,... 
        'Xdir','reverse',... 
        'Ydir','reverse'... 
        ); 
set(gcf,'Position',[200 200 750 600]); 
clear h1 h2 h3 h4 h5 i idx ii jj cm cnt color dv b h x y min l 
clear xd yd zd ZData xl yl S Pf 
 
 
E.12 – “bar_2d_avail_2fail.m” 
 
clear ndx x y ndx2 barColorMap xl st av 
count = size(states.f1,2); 
totalFails = states.f1(count-1).f2.status - 1; 
x = (1:totalFails)'; 
 
for ndx = 1:count 
    xl{ndx} = strcat(states.f1(ndx).sub, num2str(states.f1(ndx).subnum)); 
end 
 
 
for ndx = 1:count 
    for ndx2 = 1:size(states.f1(ndx).f2,2) 
        xl{end+1} = strcat(states.f1(ndx).sub,... 
                           num2str(states.f1(ndx).subnum),... 
                           states.f1(ndx).f2(ndx2).sub,... 
                           num2str(states.f1(ndx).f2(ndx2).subnum)); 
    end 
end 
 
for ndx = 1:count 
    y(ndx) = states.f1(ndx).P(10); 
    if opt.constrVio(states.f1(ndx).status) > 0.1 
        barColorMap(ndx,:) = [1,0,0]; 
    else 
        barColorMap(ndx,:) = [0,1,0]; 
%         diff = sum(states.avail) - abs(sum(states.f1(ndx).avail)); 
%         diff = diff/sum(states.avail); 
%         if sum(states.f1(ndx).avail) > 0; 
%             barColorMap(ndx,:) = [diff,0,0]; 
%         else 
%             barColorMap(ndx,:) = [0,diff,0]; 
%         end 
    end 
 
end 
 
for ndx = 1:count 
    for ndx2 = 1:size(states.f1(ndx).f2,2) 
        y(end+1) = states.f1(ndx).f2(ndx2).P(10); 
        if opt.constrVio(states.f1(ndx).f2(ndx2).status) > 0.1 
            barColorMap(end+1,:) = [1,0,0]; 
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        else 
            barColorMap(end+1,:) = [0,1,0]; 
        end 
    end 
end 
 
figure 
subplot(2,1,1);     
bar(1,nan,'g'); 
hold on 
bar(1,nan,'r'); 
hold on 
legend('All loads available','At least 1 load unavailable'); 
 
for ndx = 1 : totalFails 
 % Plot one single bar as a separate bar series. 
 h(ndx) = bar(x(ndx), y(ndx), 'BarWidth', 0.9); 
 % Apply the color to this bar series. 
 set(h(ndx),'FaceColor', barColorMap(ndx,:)); 
 % Place text atop the bar 
 %barTopper = sprintf('%.1e', y(ndx)); 
 %text(x(ndx)-0.4, y(ndx)+0.3*y(ndx), barTopper, 'FontSize', 8); 
 hold on; 
end 
title('Single and Double Failure States'); 
ylabel('State Probability'); 
set(gca,'YScale','log',... 
        'XTickMode','manual',... 
        'XTick',1:totalFails,... 
        'XTickLabel','',... 
        'YTickMode','auto',... 
        'YGrid','on',... 
        'YMinorGrid','on',... 
        'XGrid','off'); 
 
     
     
 
 
numGen = length(states.avail);  
 
xpos = zeros(totalFails,numGen); 
xneg = zeros(totalFails,numGen); 
 
for ndx = 1:count 
    for ndx2 = 1:numGen 
        if states.f1(ndx).avail(ndx2) > 0 
            xpos(ndx,ndx2) = states.f1(ndx).avail(ndx2); 
        else 
            xneg(ndx,ndx2) = states.f1(ndx).avail(ndx2); 
        end 
    end 
end 
 
for ndx = 1:count 
    for ndx2 = 1:size(states.f1(ndx).f2,2) 
        st = states.f1(ndx).f2(ndx2).status - 1; 
        for ndx3 = 1:numGen 
            av = states.f1(ndx).f2(ndx2).avail(ndx3); 
            if av > 0 
                xpos(st,ndx3) = av; 
            else 
                xneg(st,ndx3) = av; 
            end 
        end 
    end 
end 
subplot(2,1,2); 
bar(1:totalFails, xpos, 0.5, 'stack'); 
hold on 
bar(1:totalFails, xneg, 0.5, 'stack'); 
 
%title('Available Power at Each Generator'); 
ylabel('Available Power (kW)'); 
xlabel('Failed System'); 
set(gca,'XTickLabelMode','manual',... 
        'XTickLabel',xl,... 
        'XTickMode','manual',... 
        'XTickLabelRotation',90,... 
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        'XTick',1:totalFails,... 
        'Position',[0.13 0.25 0.775 0.25834]); 
 
for x = 1:numGen 
    ll{x} = strcat('Gen',num2str(x)); 
end 
     
legend(ll,'Location','southeast'); 
 
set(gcf,'Position',[1 1 500 750]); 
 
clear count ndx ndx2 x y barColorMap diff ll barTopper 
clear ndx3 numGen totalFails av st h xl  
% T = struct2table(states); 
% T1 = struct2table(states.f1); 
%  
% for i = 1:size(states.f1,1) 
%     T2struct( 
%  
% T2 = struct2table([states.f1.f2]); 
 
E.13 – “bar_2d_avail.m” 
 
count = size(states.f1,2); 
 
x = (1:count)'; 
 
for ndx = 1:count 
    y(ndx) = states.f1(ndx).P(10); 
    if opt.constrVio(states.f1(ndx).status) > 0.1 
        barColorMap(ndx,:) = [1,0,0]; 
    else 
        barColorMap(ndx,:) = [0,1,0]; 
%         diff = sum(states.avail) - abs(sum(states.f1(ndx).avail)); 
%         diff = diff/sum(states.avail); 
%         if sum(states.f1(ndx).avail) > 0; 
%             barColorMap(ndx,:) = [diff,0,0]; 
%         else 
%             barColorMap(ndx,:) = [0,diff,0]; 
%         end 
    end 
 
end 
 
 
figure 
subplot(2,1,1);     
bar(1,nan,'g'); 
hold on 
bar(1,nan,'r'); 
hold on 
legend('All loads available','At least 1 load unavailable'); 
 
for ndx = 1 : count 
 % Plot one single bar as a separate bar series. 
 h(ndx) = bar(x(ndx), y(ndx), 'BarWidth', 0.7); 
 % Apply the color to this bar series. 
 set(h(ndx),'FaceColor', barColorMap(ndx,:)); 
 % Place text atop the bar 
 barTopper = sprintf('%.1e', y(ndx)); 
 text(x(ndx)-0.4, y(ndx)+0.3*y(ndx), barTopper, 'FontSize', 8); 
 hold on; 
end 
title('Single Failure States'); 
ylabel('State Probability'); 
set(gca,'YScale','log',... 
        'XTickMode','manual',... 
        'XTick',1:count,... 
        'XTickLabel','',... 
        'YTickMode','auto',... 
        'YGrid','on',... 
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        'YMinorGrid','on',... 
        'XGrid','off'); 
 
     
     
for ndx = 1:count 
    xl(ndx) = strcat(states.f1(ndx).type, num2str(states.f1(ndx).num)); 
end 
 
 
 
 
 
xpos = zeros(count,length(states.avail)); 
xneg = zeros(count,length(states.avail)); 
for ndx = 1:count 
    for ndx2 = 1:length(states.avail) 
        if states.f1(ndx).avail(ndx2) > 0 
            xpos(ndx,ndx2) = states.f1(ndx).avail(ndx2); 
        else 
            xneg(ndx,ndx2) = states.f1(ndx).avail(ndx2); 
        end 
    end 
end 
 
subplot(2,1,2); 
bar(1:count, xpos, 0.5, 'stack'); 
hold on 
bar(1:count, xneg, 0.5, 'stack'); 
 
%title('Available Power at Each Generator'); 
ylabel('Available Power (kW)'); 
xlabel('Failed System'); 
set(gca,'XTickLabelMode','manual',... 
        'XTickLabel',xl,... 
        'XTickMode','manual',... 
        'XTickLabelRotation',90,... 
        'XTick',1:count,... 
        'Position',[0.13 0.25 0.775 0.25834]); 
 
for x = 1:length(states.avail) 
    ll{x} = strcat('Gen',num2str(x)); 
end 
     
legend(ll,'Location','southeast'); 
 
set(gcf,'Position',[1 1 500 750]); 
 
clear count ndx ndx2 x y barColorMap xl xpos xneg diff ll barTopper 
 
% T = struct2table(states); 
% T1 = struct2table(states.f1); 
%  
% for i = 1:size(states.f1,1) 
%     T2struct( 
%  
% T2 = struct2table([states.f1.f2]); 
 
E.14 – “bar_1d.m” 
 
close all 
count = size(states.f1,2); 
 
x = (1:count)'; 
 
for ndx = 1:count 
    y(ndx) = states.f1(ndx).P(10); 
 
    if opt.constrVio(states.f1(ndx).status) > 1E-14 
        barColorMap(ndx,:) = [0,0,1]; 
    else 
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        diff = sum(states.avail) - abs(sum(states.f1(ndx).avail)) 
        diff = diff/sum(states.avail) 
        if sum(states.f1(ndx).avail) > 0; 
            barColorMap(ndx,:) = [diff,0,0]; 
        else 
            barColorMap(ndx,:) = [0,diff,0]; 
        end 
    end 
 
end 
%h = bar(b,diag([states.f1(:).P]),'stacked') 
%set(gca,'YScale','log') 
%set(h(1),'facecolor','r'); 
 
 
 
%barColorMap = hot(count); 
 
for ndx = 1 : count 
 % Plot one single bar as a separate bar series. 
 h(ndx) = bar(x(ndx), y(ndx), 'BarWidth', 0.7); 
 % Apply the color to this bar series. 
 set(h(ndx),'FaceColor', barColorMap(ndx,:)); 
 % Place text atop the bar 
 barTopper = sprintf('%.1e', y(ndx)); 
 text(x(ndx)-0.4, y(ndx)+0.3*y(ndx), barTopper, 'FontSize', 8); 
 
 hold on; 
    grid on; 
end 
 
title('Single Failure States'); 
ax = gca; 
ax.YScale = 'log'; 
ylabel('State Probability'); 
xlabel('Failed System'); 
 
ax.XTickMode = 'manual'; 
ax.XTick = 1:count; 
ax.YTickMode = 'auto'; 
%ax.YTick = 0:0.1:1; 
 
 
for ndx = 1:count 
    xl(ndx) = strcat(states.f1(ndx).type, num2str(states.f1(ndx).num)); 
end 
ax.XTickLabelMode = 'manual'; 
ax.XTickLabel = xl; 
 
ax.XTickLabelRotation = 90; 
 
ax.YGrid = 'on'; 
ax.YMinorGrid = 'on'; 
ax.XGrid = 'off'; 
 
 
% T = struct2table(states); 
% T1 = struct2table(states.f1); 
%  
% for i = 1:size(states.f1,1) 
%     T2struct( 
%  
% T2 = struct2table([states.f1.f2]); 
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APPENDIX F – TRU DATASHEET [17] 
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APPENDIX G – CAFTA FTA, SMALL TEST ARCHITECTURE 
 
